Introduction
At six minutes past seven on the morning of 19 September 2014, David Cameron strode out of 10 Downing Street to offer his verdict on the Scottish independence referendum. Welcoming the no vote, he reiterated the commitment to further devolution of powers to Scotland that he had made, in conjunction with Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg, on the front page of the Daily Record just three days earlier. By ten past seven he had moved on to discuss the rest of the United Kingdom, arguing that the quid pro quo for H the West Lothian Question. He argued that as the people of Scotland will have more power over their affairs, so it follows that the people of England, Wales and Northern Ireland must have a bigger say over theirs F I have long believed that a crucial part missing from this national discussion is England. We have heard the voice of Scotland -and now the millions of voices of England must also be heard. Importantly, Cameron also suggested that English votes for E S 1 Given the tight timetable for devolving new powers to the Scottish Parliament outlined by Gordon Brown during the referendum campaign, and later endorsed by the three main pro-Union parties, this implied a settlement being put in place before the dissolution of the Westminster parliament for the 2015 general election.
T P M decision to thrust English votes for English laws (henceforth EvfEl) into the centre of debate attracted the charge that he was seeking to exploit the referendum aftermath for party political advantage, and fractured the shaky alliance that had led the major Westminster parties to agree the devo-max proposals for Scotland. It drew strongly worded censure from the D P M N C C E El the C U 2 C could also be seen as surprising given his repeated assertion of Accepted version of article published in Political Quarterly, (2015) , vol. 86(1), pp. 125-132. For published version please visit: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-923X.12142/epdf 3 his sense of attachment to the Union, and his professed determination to maintain it all costs. Indeed, the shock publication twelve days before referendum day of a YouGov poll that placed the Yes campaign in the lead was widely credited with jolting the N grant S P B
formula. 3 This method of allocating resources to the devolved nations has long faced criticism for its Following this the article assesses the way in which EvfEl was reignited in the aftermath of the referendum, arguing that the issue is now highly charged politically. Finally, it considers the outlook for EvfEl and considers the possible implications in 2015 and beyond.
A reforming Coalition?
During the 2010 general election campaign, voters could have been forgiven for believing that the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats were quite some distance apart on a range of issues most notably deficit reduction, on which the latter sided with L by warning of the risks to economic recovery of cutting spending too quickly or too early. Embedding deficit reduction in the Coalition Agreement as the overriding priority of the new government was therefore a significant strategic victory for the Conservatives, helping ensure their dominance over large swathes of public policy. The Liberal Democrats were nonetheless widely credited with some important wins of their own, particularly in relation to constitutional reform, which had long been a priority for the party.
David Laws, who led the coalition negotiations for the junior partner, revealed that it was the C decisive in securing the agreement. However, as Robert Hazell has noted, the Conservatives also came into the talks with a substantial programme for constitutional reform, even if they did not regard it as one of their
, and unsurprisingly offered to grant new powers to both the Welsh Assembly and the Scottish Parliament. A commission to consider the West Lothian Question was promised, a tactic used in relation to a number of issues where common ground was not readily available.
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The headline-grabbing constitutional measures contained in the Coalition agreement were the referendum on AV, which was linked to both a cut in the number of MPs and an equalisation of constituency sizes (a Conservative priority); fixed-term parliaments; and Lords reform. As Hazell argued however, it proved easier to negotiate these compromises at elite level than to win over backbenchers in Parliament and implement them in practice. The Conservatives were deeply 
The referendum aftermath
It has become something of a cliché to suggest that the West Lothian Question is one that cannot be satisfactorily answered, and therefore (as Lord Irvine once suggested) one that is better not asked. Cameron was inclined to neglect getting around to dealing with this thorny issue. Although opinion polls suggested that when asked voters tended to agree with the beguiling principle of EvfEl, it had never become a salient concern. Indeed, the formation of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition helped to diffuse the matter, as together the two parties enjoy a substantial majority both in England and in the UK as a whole. In contrast, a rainbow coalition of the left, as some Liberal
Democrats had hoped for, W L Q falling a long way short of a majority in England. 15 Given the problems identified with the main proposed solutions to the question, declining to tackle it could be seen as a plausible conservative response: as one rightleaving it alone causes less trouble than addressing it. And first, do no harm is supposed to be a Tory principle. 16 And while the Liberal Democrats remained ostensibly wedded to the principle of federalism, they had demonstrated little appetite for developing serious proposals to make it happen in practice. The spectrum of propositions from the Conservatives also illustrates the divergence of opinion that can be found on EvfEl within the party, and this was also evident in the Commons debate on the command paper. 
Conclusion: 2015 and beyond
The 2010 parliament has witnessed some important developments in relation to the English Question, with the implementation of procedural changes in the House of Commons to address
West Lothian now looking much more likely than not. However, this shift has come about despite conflict within the Coalition over the issue, and has been driven by external events and party management pressures rather than by agreement to drive things forward at the top of government.
Somewhat ironically for an administration that came into office with a radical agenda for constitutional reform, the key changes it has overseen, namely the recalibration of the Union with needed to be dealt with to head off the threat of greater English disquiet in the future. Even if the opportunity to nip in the bud this potential for resentment existed then, it seems improbable that it could be so easily despatched now. The evidence from the other nations of the UK is that devolution leads to demands for further recognition and powers rather than less. The items that would be next E discontent have already been felt: the Barnett formula, taxation and public spending would surely soon be the next areas where more vocal demands would be heard.
Looming over all of this in the near term is the 2015 general election, the result of which could rapidly intensify the public demand for the political status of England to be more clearly resolved. At present the opinion pollsters and psephologists appear only to agree that the election is far too close to call, with a hung parliament the most likely outcome. As well as the question of which party will be the largest (Labour or the Conservatives), three other factors are in play which make the result particularly difficult to foresee, and which all have important potential consequences in relation to the English Question. The first is whether the Liberal Democrats will be decimated, as their headline poll ratings currently suggest, or whether they will be able to hold onto a good number of seats In the context of ongoing austerity in the public finances, the fiercest disputes are likely to revolve around questions of resource allocation. Already at this early stage of the election campaign, London-based newspapers have voiced outrage at the suggestion by the new leader of the Labour Party in Scotland, Jim Murphy, that the mansion tax (which would mainly affect the capital) will be used to help fund the NHS in Scotland. Should such a tax be implemented by a Labour-led government lacking a majority in England, and be portrayed as being diverted to Scotland, the backlash against the government from the London-elite could be ferocious, quite possibly leading to the demand that all property taxation be devolved to the London Assembly.
The third factor is the rise of UKIP. While the party is still not widely expected to make large gains in terms of seats, its capacity to win a substantial share of the vote makes the election highly unpredictable. In addition, the party is arguably best placed to exploit and mobilise the politics of resentment in England, and is likely to seek to do so. One recent survey found that UKIP is the party most trusted to argue for the interests of England. UKIP supporters also identified most strongly with England and were more likely to favour harder solutions to the West Lothian Question. 24 As in other areas such as Europe and immigration, the UKIP effect could therefore be to push the Conservatives (and possibly even Labour) into taking a more vigorously and overtly English, rather than Unionist, stance.
All of this suggests that the politics of Englishness is likely to be an important feature of the political landscape over the coming decade, and is something that future governments will, however unwillingly, need to respond to. 
